ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
The effects of works councils on most aspects of firm performance -profitability, labor productivity, employment growth, and more recently investment in tangible capitalhave been investigated for a number of years now (for a survey, see Addison et al., 2004b) . Altogether less well investigated have been their effects on wages. This is at first blush curious because analysts reporting adverse effects on other outcomes have tended to rely on rent-seeking behavior, and not just bureaucratization, by way of explanation for their findings. On closer inspection, however, the source of the comparative neglect of wage determination is clear: data limitations. Typically, plant-level data sets only contain information on average wages, derived from data on the total wage bill and employment.
A proper ceteris paribus earnings analysis requires the estimation of an augmented
Mincerian function on the basis of individual data, without which direct investigation of rent seeking is hamstrung. Arguably some research may also have been deflected by the very terms of the German legislation -the Works Constitution Act -that foreclose wage bargaining by the works council unless this is expressly provided for under the relevant sectoral wage agreement.
With the recent availability of linked employer-employee datasets we can do much more. Not only can we look at works council effects on wages holding constant human capital, demographic, and other individual (and plant) characteristics, we can also inspect the entire wage distribution. This focus is appropriate because it might be hypothesized that works councils seek equal pay and reduced earnings dispersion. This propensity may be an insurance strategy and reflect the preferences of risk-averse employees (Horn and Svensson, 1986) . Further, an earnings function approach in conjunction with information on tenure also permits the analyst to address explanations other than rent seeking for wage premia attaching to plants with works councils.
In the present paper, we will deploy one such data set, the nationally representative linked employer-employee data set of the IAB (LIAB), which combines the employment register statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the Institute for Employment
Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-und Berufsforschung, or IAB) Establishment Panel.
The LIAB is described in section IV and is prefaced in section III by a statement of our empirical model, which draws on Card and de la Rica (2006) insightful treatment.
Section V then contains our detailed findings organized along the dimensions of wages, the wage structure, and job tenure. All of this is preceded, however, by a consideration of the institutional setting, including a review of the sparse existing literature on works councils and wages.
II. The Institutional Setting

Works Councils, Collective Bargaining and the Dual System
Collective bargaining in Germany is formally based on trade unions and employers' associations. With the exception of some firms that conclude their own agreements with unions, collective bargaining over wages and conditions (job classifications, working time, and working conditions) is conducted outside the plant. Decisions on strikes and lockouts are similarly detached from the local level. Works councils, on the other hand, focus on production issues, handle individual grievances, and are charged with the implementation of collective agreements at the plant level. They may only negotiate plant agreements with local management on matters that are not covered, or not usually covered, by collective agreements, unless a collective agreement expressly authorizes otherwise (section 77(3) of the Works Constitution Act). That said, they have always been involved in wage setting for two main reasons. First, their extensive codetermination rights (noted below) convey power that can be exercised sotto voce.
Secondly, wage drift has long characterized wage determination in German manufacturing. One-size-fits-all collective agreements necessarily do not allow for individual needs (historically, those of the high fliers) and they have been accompanied by the lubricant of wage drift. Works councils have actively participated in the fixing of wages above Tarif levels (i.e. the formal wage schedules set under collective bargaining) and the provision of special bonuses and allowances. Nevertheless, collective bargaining agreements have always been accorded a higher status than workplace agreements.
The functions of works councils are fixed under law. According to the Works Constitution Act, works councils may be set up in all establishments with at least five permanent employees following a petition by a small group of workers or by a trade union represented at the establishment. While mandated, then, works councils are not automatic. Works councilors are elected in secret ballot for a 4-year term, and they represent all workers not just union members. Although works councils are formally independent of unions, as a practical matter ties between the two agencies are close, three out of five works councilors being union members. Traditionally, they have assisted in union recruitment at the place of work. Because of this function they have been referred to as "pillars of union security" (Müller-Jentsch, 1995, p. 610) .
The law provides the works council with far-reaching rights of information and consultation -in areas such as manpower planning, and changes in work processes, the working environment, and job content -together with an explicit set of codetermination or joint-management rights on so-called 'social matters.' The latter include the commencement and termination of working hours, principles of remuneration, pay arrangements including the fixing of job and bonus rates, the regulation of overtime and reduced working hours, holiday arrangements, and health and safety matters. The works council also enjoys 'consent rights' in matters of hiring and firing as well as job classification (the placement of workers in certain wage groups). Further, works council authority -as indexed by formal competence and size (including the number of full-time councilors) -is increasing in establishment size.
Over time the competence or authority of the works council has increased. The first Works Constitution Act in 1952, which still forms much of the basis of the information, consultation, and codetermination right of the works council, emphasized the independence of the works council and recognized only limited rights for unions in the plant. Works councils were also prohibited from striking, as indeed they still are. The second Works Constitution Act in 1972 materially extended the information and consultation rights of the works council in respect of management decisions involving changes in capacity, working operations, and production processes, as well as strengthening codetermination rights by allowing for adjudication in the event of an impasse. It also improved the access of unions to the workplace and permitted them to submit lists of candidates in works council elections, as well as allowing works councilors to hold union office. The most recent legislation -the 2001 Works Constitution Reform Act -sought to stimulate works council formation, to strengthen existing works councils (e.g. by increasing the number of full-time works councilors), and to improve the operation of the works council apparatus. In the latter exercise, cost was said to be secondary to democracy at the workplace (for details, see Addison et al., 2004a) . At the same time, acceptance by management of the entity seems to have grown.
The reason is that, while typically cut from the union cloth, works councilors are often more pragmatic and flexible than unions.
Works Councils and Wages
As noted earlier, there is comparatively little information on the effect of works councils on wages. The literature on the impact of collective bargaining proper on wages is also sparse (see below). As far as works council impact is concerned, the early literature comes to different conclusions. Thus, in their analysis of 60 firms in the metal working industry, using pooled data for 1977 and 1979 , FitzRoy and Kraft (1985 fail to detect any positive effect of works councils on wages.
1 Rather, the authors attribute the adverse effect of works councils on their performance measure -specifically, firm profitabilityto slower decision making rather than to rent seeking. By contrast, in an analysis of 50 industrial firms in 1990/91, Addison et al. (1993) obtain a significantly positive coefficient estimate for a works council dummy variable in their OLS and LMS/RLS wage regressions (see also Meyer, 1995a ).
More recent studies using larger datasets also present a mixed picture. In an analysis of the first wave of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, covering manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony, Addison et al. (2001) report in OLS wage regressions that wages are approximately 15 to 18.5 percent higher in works council regimes. The authors also investigate the gap between the wage fixed at industry/regional level and that paid at the establishment, using management-reported estimates of the percentage wage gap (übertarifliche Entlohnung). 2 The authors' Tobit estimates fail to indicate any influence of works councils on the wage gap for either blue-collar or white-collar employees. However, in exploiting a question in the panel inquiring of managers whether or not the works council was jointly involved in determining the wage gap, Addison et al. (1997) report that the gap is higher where the works council is involved in wage determination.
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The most recent study to investigate works council wage effects also uses (two waves of) the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel. Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) offer a test of the Freeman-Lazear (1995) model that, where a council coexists/is embedded in a collective bargaining agreement, councils and local management are likely to maximize the joint surplus. In contrast, where there is no collective agreement (external to the firm) there is said to be little to constrain rent-seeking councils. 4 Interestingly, Hübler and Jirjahn report no evidence of an effect of collective bargaining on wages, which they justify on the grounds that the outcome of collective agreements is usually extended to the overwhelming number of employees in an industry (but see , for a discussion of the erosion of collective bargaining coverage). 5 For their part, works councils are found to have a positive effect on wages, which outcome is more evident for the uncovered sample. They are also associated with a well-defined positive effect on productivity in the covered sector.
Yet more recent studies have examined the link between collective bargaining proper and wages, but without controlling for works council presence. Using the same dataset as that employed in the present paper, albeit for 1996 rather than 2001, Kölling et al. (2005) find that, contrary to the previous study, collective bargaining at sectoral level raises wages, at least for the least-skilled workers. Another study by Stephan and Gerlach (2005) , again using linked employer-employee data -but this time for Lower Saxonyfor the years 1990, 1995, and 2001 reports evidence of a rising wage premium over time for the average covered worker. Specifically, the wage gain for working under an industry-level collective bargaining agreement increased from 4 percent in 1991, through 9 percent in 1995, to 12 percent in 2001.
As we see it, the suggestions derived from the empirical literature are as follows.
First, and most important, works councils may indeed influence wages, despite section 77 (3) of the Constitution Act. But the manner of that influence can be subtle; in particular, the effect may vary along the skills continuum and the wage distribution. Further, in circumstances where that effect hinges on management being willing or choosing to discuss supplementary payments, the premium may reflect the payment of efficiency wages. Second, collective bargaining proper may be expected to influence wages in Germany no less than in other nations.
III. Methodology
Earnings regressions
Our starting point is the standard Mincerian earnings function in which individual (log)
wages, y i , are a function of (observed) productive characteristics, X 1i , to include both general and specific skills (proxied by schooling, tenure, and occupation), and control variables specific to establishments, Z j . In particular, we are interested in the specific role of the works council institution, F j . We thus specify the model
It is natural to assume that this model suffers from heterogeneity bias (or omitted variable bias), in the sense that not all relevant individual (productive) characteristics are observed (or collected by the researcher). If unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be correlated with the observed characteristics, then it is straightforward to show that the (OLS) coefficients estimates of model (1) will be biased. 6 One way to control for heterogeneity bias is to assume that workers in the same workplace share some common (unobserved) characteristics. Adding establishment-average characteristics X 2j to equation (1) may enable us to control for a key source of contamination. Accordingly, we
where, X 1i , X 2j , and Z j denote the characteristics of workers, co-workers in the same establishment, and establishments, respectively, and F j again denotes the works council status of the establishment.
Finally, to control for the possibility of an establishment self-selecting into works council status, we add to the model the predicted propensity score -that is, the estimated probability (or the normal hazard function) of a given establishment having a works council, , giving
This model will be estimated for all workers and for men and women separately, using both OLS and quantile regression methods. This allows us to inquire into the anatomy of the works council wage mark-up for different groups of employees.
Job Tenure
As hypothesized earlier, the payment of higher wages in works council establishments may reflect either the ability of works councils to extract a bigger portion of the pie (surplus) or the ability of firms to extract a higher worker effort from workers by paying efficiency wages. In the former case, workers are paid above 'normal' wages, and we should observe, everything else constant, higher tenure, T i . In the latter case, establishments pay a compensating differential and no correlation between tenure and works council status should be expected. To test these conflicting hypotheses, we specify the following model
Once again the parameter estimates -in particular, the coefficient δ -may be biased. In order to capture the true impact of works councils on tenure, therefore, we will adopt the strategy followed by Card and de la Rica (2006) . Specifically, in a first step, we look at the wage profile of workers by estimating model (2) for the sample of workers in non-works council establishments. We next interact the predicted (log) wage, , with the
The parameter γ will then give the impact of works councils on tenure after controlling for the average (non-works council) effect of wages on tenure.
IV. Data
Our data are taken from the 2001 wave of the LIAB. As noted above, the LIAB combines Federal Employment Agency employment statistics with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of the LIAB is the combination of information on individuals and details concerning the establishments that employ them.
The employment statistics are drawn from the German employment register, which contains information on more than 98 percent of the employees and trainees included in the establishment panel (Alda, 2005 For the purposes of the present inquiry it was also necessary to have data on length of tenure. However, and similar to the information on wages, the tenure data are also censored. In the case of western Germany some 9 percent of employees have their tenure censored (at 25 years of tenure), while for eastern Germany 35 percent of the sample have censored tenure data (at 10 years of tenure). Since most of the censored individuals are employed in works council establishments, dropping them may be expected to materially bias the results. For this reason, we decided to impute tenure using the same procedure as described above for wages.
The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel, was initiated in 1993 (Kölling, 2000) . It is based on a stratified random sample -strata for 16
industries and 10 employment size classes -from the population of all establishments. Our selected establishments are thus required to be in both waves. Sectoral coverage includes manufacturing and services, and excludes not-for-profit organizations. In addition, only full-time individuals aged between 19 and 65 years are included in the sample (apprentices were excised). Finally, in order to include only establishments where in principle works councils can be present, we dropped all workers in establishments with less than five employees. Matching the selected employees to the selected establishments resulted in an estimation/regression sample of 1,344,656 workers across 8,579
establishments.
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we also ran the same estimations for establishments with 21 to 100 employees. There are two reasons to choose plants within this size interval: in the first place, the powers of their councils are to all intents and purposes fixed (otherwise, they are increasing in establishment size);
and, in the second place, only a tiny minority of smaller plants with less than 21 employees have works councils while the large preponderance of establishments with more than 100 employees have them (Addison and Teixeira, 2006) . For our sample of establishments with 21 to 100 employees, roughly 38 percent of establishments and 45 percent of employees are covered by works councils. Finally, we also test whether the wage effect of works councils depends on the collective bargaining regime and if it differs between selected groups of employees. Accordingly, we add interaction terms between these variables and the works council dummy.
V. Findings
Summary data on worker (mean) characteristics for the entire sample and by gender and works council status are given in Table 1a . Clearly, workers in works council establishments have higher wages than their non-works council counterparts (with log daily wages of 4.59 and 4.13, respectively) and men also earn more than women (log wages of 4.61 and 4.37, respectively). There is also evidence that white-collar workers are more prevalent in works council establishments, while low skilled blue-collar workers are in greater preponderance in non-works council workplaces by 11 percentage point margin.
7 Overall, the proportion of workers in the two lowest skill categories, if not educational categories, is also higher in establishments where no works council is present. Not surprisingly perhaps, collective bargaining coverage is almost universal (94 percent) for workers in works council establishments but much lower in the case of plants without councils (42 percent). Differences in collective agreement coverage by gender are minimal, and the same is true of the gender differences in schooling. Some 90 percent of all workers are in establishments with works councils.
( Tables 1a and 1b near here) Corresponding establishment means are presented in Table 1b . As it is apparent, there are fewer works council establishments than non-works council establishmentsthe latter outnumber the former by a twelve percentage point margin. The disparity with respect to Table 1a is due to the fact that bigger establishments (namely those with 250 or more workers) have almost complete works council coverage. Wages are 37 percent higher in works council establishments, and tenure is 2.7 years longer. Collective bargaining coverage is also much higher in works council establishments. Finally, establishment-level data point to lower tenure on average among women than men, while overtime supplements are also much more frequent among men. These two aspects may be expected to contribute to the observed wage gender gap of a little over 20 percent in favor of men, observed at both individual and establishment level.
( Tables 2a and 2b near here) (log) wage differential in favor of works councils earlier reported in Table 1a . This premium falls dramatically (by around three-quarters) once establishment and individual employee characteristics are added to the specification. This means that a large share of the wage gap can be explained by systematic sorting of firms and employees.
Specifically, after adding worker characteristics the works council wage differential is around 13.2 percent (column 2) and this falls to 11.1 percent (column 3) with the further addition of plant characteristics and the proxies for differences between workers (the average co-worker variables). The covariates have the expected signs (see Gürtzgen, 2005; Card and de la Rica, 2006) . That is, wages increase with age, tenure, qualifications, and professional status. They are lower for women and foreigners. Further, wages are higher in larger establishments, in establishments applying collective wage agreements, as well as in establishments earning high profits and paying overtime supplements.
There is little indication that self-selection by establishments into works council status accounts for much of this (reduced) wage premium. The propensity score coefficient is statistically significant but, comparing columns (3) and (4), it can be seen that there is only a trivial increase in the differential -from 11.1 to 11.4 percent -with the addition of this argument. The propensity that a works councils is present is calculated using the standard covariates (see Addison et al., 1997) : establishment size and establishment size squared, the share of blue-collar, temporary workers, female, and parttime employees, establishment age (dummy), collective bargaining (at establishment and sector level), payment above levels set under collective bargaining, the profit situation (dummy), location (in eastern versus western Germany), and 16 sector dummies -the Probit regression, not reported here but available from the authors on request, is well defined with a pseudo-R 2 of 0.37, and all covariates (other than payment above the collective bargaining level) are statistically significant at conventional levels and of the expected sign.
The premium associated with collective bargaining coverage (at either sectoral or establishment level) is around 6 percent. This is one-half that reported by Gerlach (2005, p. 2301) in their study of Lower Saxony, but taken together the two sets of findings using matched employer-employee data help dispel the illusion that extension of coverage implies the absence of a union premium.
Turning to the separate results by gender in Table 2b , we obtain the interesting ceteris paribus result that the presence of a works council benefits female workers in particular. Since women have lower wages on average, this finding implies that the institution attenuates the gender differential in Germany. This attenuation is also reported by Gartner and Stephan (2004) , using the decomposition suggested by Juhn et al. (1993) .
As shown in Appendix Table 2 , we obtain the same result if we pool the two sub-samples (of men and women workers) and interact the works council argument with a female dummy variable. It is estimated in this case that the wage gender gap in works council establishments decreases by 9.8 percent.
( Table 3 near here)
The presence of a gender gap is also confirmed in Table 3 for all schooling levels.
From the second row of the table it can be seen that females earn between 12.3 and 18.5 percent less than do males. For its part, the wage premium associated with works council presence is broadly though not monotonically decreasing in the skill (or schooling) level, namely, from around 11 percent for the least skilled (secondary education without a professional qualification) to 8.7 percent for workers with a university degree. So there is some indication that works councils play a role in wage compression, narrowing to some degree the wage gap between high-and low-schooling individuals and the gender wage gap. We note, however, that this picture is less evident when we interact the works council dummy with the education dummies (see Appendix Table 2 ).
( Table 4 near here) Table 4 gives some results from fitting quantile regressions to our earnings data for all workers and separately by gender. The table provides results for the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 quantiles. We see that the wage premium for being covered by a works council is significantly declining in earnings for the entire sample and also for men and for women. For females, the premium for the 0.2 quantile is almost 20 percent as compared with only percent, respectively. These results show again that works councils have a an impact on wage compression in Germany.
The wage impact of works councils might be dependent on the collective bargaining regime. We therefore also interacted the works council dummy with our two collective bargaining variables (at sector and firm level). The results are reported in Appendix there is a works council we observe minor differences between wages in the two collective bargaining regimes.
The impact of works councils on the wage structure can also be examined using wage dispersion information aggregated at the establishment level. To this end, we computed two straightforward measures of wage dispersion within establishments: the standard deviation of individual wages and the coefficient of variation. Appendix Table 3 presents the results of this exercise. The bottom line is that there is again evidence of works councils reducing wage dispersion (irrespective of the collective bargaining regime). However, the reductions in the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of wages in works council establishments are only just around -0.8 and -0.02, respectively.
Finally, we tackle the important issue of whether higher tenure is a consequence of rent-seeking or efficiency wages. We estimate the tenure model given by equations (4) and (5). The results are reported in Table 5 . If works councils imply higher wages, ceteris paribus workers in establishments with works councils will tend to have greater tenure.
The results in the first column of the table confirm this: the coefficient estimate for the works council term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that workers in establishments with works councils do indeed have higher job tenure. On average, workers covered by works councils have 1.6 years of additional tenure. Observe that since the estimated model contains one dummy for each year of age, we are strictly comparing individuals of the same age. The works council effect on tenure of male and female workers is virtually the same.
( Table 5 near here)
The tenure regression in the first column of Table 5 does not include a direct control for wages. A strong and enduring finding in the literature is that the higher are earnings, the lower is turnover and thence (abstracting from the issue of the effect of tenure on earnings) the higher is tenure (Farber, 1994) . In order to isolate the effect of works councils on tenure and address directly the wage impact on tenure, we follow the approach by Card and de la Rica (2006) . We first identify the wage profile in other than works council establishments and then interact the predicted wages obtained from this regression with the works council dummy. The logic behind this approach is that if the wage premium is a compensating differential -or a return to unmeasured quality differences between workers -it should not necessarily influence job tenure. The results of this exercise are reported in the second column of Table 5 . For the entire sample, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the tenure gap is increasing in (expected) wages. The size of this effect is nevertheless rather small: wages have almost to double to generate an additional year of tenure. This result suggests that while works councils increase wages (and tenure) of all workers, the major implication seems to be a more compressed wage structure, which is then translated into a relatively small tenure gap over the distribution of wages/skills. As is readily apparent from the results in the last two columns of Table 5 , the results carry over to male and female workers. Note that, for female workers, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between predicted wages and works councils is clearly smaller than for males and fails to achieve statistical significance.
At this stage it is also worthwhile to attempt to disentangle the relative importance of wages versus works council regime on the tenure profiles of individuals through a different route. The question is again one of whether the observed higher tenure in works council plants results from the greater attractiveness/efficiency of workplaces with works councils or instead reflects the outcome of rent-seeking process (vulgo: the 'voice' versus 'monopoly' arguments adapted to the works council institution). We carry out this test by implementing the Freeman-Medoff tenure model for unions in which the two effectsvoice and monopoly -are assumed to be captured simply by looking at the corresponding elasticity.
9 (Table 6 near here)
The results are given in Table 6 . As in our equations (4) and (5) above, this approach assumes away the simultaneity bias arising from the possibility that wages increase with tenure and also the possibility that innately more stable individuals might select into works council establishments (Freeman, 1980, claims As a final robustness check on our results, we offer further evidence for a more homogeneous sub-sample of establishments. In order to capture an establishment size bracket with comparable formal powers of works councils and a relatively even distribution of establishments with and without works councils, we restrict ourselves to establishments with between 21 and 100 employees. This sub-sample of smaller establishments contains many fewer individuals (some 100,000 workers in 3,000 establishments). Descriptive statistics are contained in Appendix Table 4a , from which it can be seen again that for works council establishments, average (log) wages are higher and that job tenure is higher. Employees´ qualifications and age in these establishments are also slightly higher. Establishments with works councils finally are less prone to report high profits, modern technical equipment, or overtime supplements.
As can be seen from Appendix Tables 4b through 4e , there is a clear reduction in the works council premium in the sub-sample of establishments employing 21 to 100 employees. 10 At the risk of some over-simplification, the wage effect of works councils is reduced by 30 to 50 percent in comparison with the results for the entire sample. This provides evidence that establishment size matters. Works councils are again more favorable to women than men, but the role of councils in reducing wage dispersion is less visible. Indeed, differences in coefficients estimates in the quantile regressions are minimal, and even increase for men (see Appendix Table 4e ). As a consequence the impact of works councils on the standard deviation of wages is positive, while it is negative but smaller than for the entire sample in the case of the other (coefficient of variation) measure.
Finally, there is evidence that works councils significantly increase job tenure also in the restricted sample (by an extra 0.8 years), but no evidence that increased tenure comes about through via higher wages as the interaction term (predicted wages*works council) is never statistically significant (in Appendix Table 4f ). The results from the Freeman-Medoff model suggest in turn that the voice argument is less important for this employment size interval than for other establishments: the works council dummy is clearly smaller while the wage impact on tenure is comparable (see Appendix Table 4g and compare with Table 6 ).
VI. Conclusions
This paper has looked at the works council impact on the anatomy of wages in Germany.
It has demonstrated that the positive impact of the entity on wages is higher than that of collective bargaining proper either at sectoral or establishment level. Works councils are, then, associated with a wage premium despite the fact that they are formally enjoined not to engage in wage bargaining. To our knowledge, this is the first occasion on which this result has been reported for matched-employer-employee data, although it has been observed before in establishment panel data sets using information on average earnings.
But note that in the present treatment we were able to control for unobserved worker and establishment heterogeneity while also accounting for the selection of plants into works council status.
Another important result, generated from our quantile regressions, was that the wage effect tends to be greatest lower down in the earnings distribution, analogous to results reported for formal collective bargaining. As a consequence, works councils reduce the standard deviation of wages and the coefficient of variation of wages in a manner comparable to collective bargaining. In contrast to the literature on collective wage agreements, however, we found that women profit more from the presence of works councils than do men and that, accordingly, works councils attenuate the gender wage gap. Wage compression is higher in Germany than in most other industrialized countries (Fitzenberger, 1999) , and is associated with high and persistent unemployment that mainly affects lower-skilled employees and those who previously worked in jobs at the bottom end of the wage distribution (Siebert, 1997) . Although there are many different explanations for why wages in Germany are so compressed (and remain so), few if any of them seem to be convincing (Muysken and Zwick, 2006) . Subject to the caveat provided by our results for the restricted firm sample, the institution of works councils therefore is an interesting additional explanation that has previously received scant attention.
Finally, we also investigated whether the longer tenure of employees in works councils establishments reflected higher wages, signaling rent extraction, or compensating differentials. Once we interacted predicted wages from an equation describing wages of employees in establishments without works councils with the works council dummy à la Card and de la Rica (2006), we found that only a small part of the higher wages seem to indicate rent seeking. This finding was confirmed by comparing the direct effect of wages and works councils on tenure using the Freeman-Medoff (1984) approach. Gender ( Notes: see Table 2a . . 123 
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